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Abstract
This paper sets up an OLG economy with endogenous life expectancy to study how Þscal policy
that redistributes between generations can open the door to sunspot equilibria. Agents invest
independently in their own human capital, produce and consume output, and receive a pension upon
retirement. The model produces an expectations coordination problem that can explain signiÞcant
di erences in growth paths followed by otherwise identical countries. In particular, we show that
our economy may be characterised by local indeterminacy of dynamic equilibria, and hence feature
ßuctuations which are driven by extrinsic uncertainty.
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11 Introduction
Recent years have seen an extensive research on the possibility of indeterminate equilibria in dynamic
general equilibrium models.1 This literature is motivated by the di culties in explaining di!erences in
growth in di!erent countries and accounting for various empirically observed growth paths by means of
the usual economic fundamentals.2
Indeterminacy of equilibria can be either global or local. The Þrst kind corresponds to multiple
balanced growth paths (BGPs hereafter), while the second kind refers to the existence of a continuum of
transition paths leading to a given BGP and a possibility of existence of sunspot equilibria.3 Multiplicity
of equilibrium paths can explain why otherwise similar countries may be characterize by di!erent per
capita incomes and/or di!erent growth rates.
In general, it has been shown that indeterminacy is the consequence of non-decreasing returns to
capital, monopolistic competition or some forms of production externalities that generate non-decreasing
returns at the social level - that is, of what may generate persistent growth in the Þrst place.4 Here,
instead, we focus on the role of intergenerational redistribution in opening the door to sunspot equilibria,
when agents invest independently in their human capital and longevity is increasing with aggregate
human capital.5
We show that intergenerational transfers may distort human capital accumulation for any given
rationally anticipated longevity, and thereby a!ect actual longevity. If investment in human capital
is indeed responsive to the tax particulars, then intergenerational transfers generate indeterminate
equilibria, and in particular local indeterminacy. This implies that self-fulÞlling beliefs of economic
agents or sunspots determine the equilibrium path, since the initial human capital investment is freely
chosen. So, when longevity is increasing with the average level of human capital, our economy can
feature endogenous business cycles - i.e business cycles which are driven by extrinsic as opposed to
intrinsic uncertainty - due to the external e!ects of intergenerational redistribution.
As in any endogenous growth model, government policies can generate di!erences in the growth
paths followed by otherwise similar economies. Nevertheless, our work highlights that identical economies,
even with the same pension particulars (like the pension rate and the choice between funded or pay-as-
you-go pensions), may feature di!erent growth patterns and di!erent income taxes even in the absence
1See Benhabib and Farmer (1999) for a survey.
2See, for instance, Levine and Renelt (1992) and Benhabib and Gali (1995).
3See, for instance, Shell (1987).
4For an alternative model, emphasising indeterminacy of the distribution of the uniquely determined total wealth and
income, see Krussel and Rios-Rull (1999).
5A number of studies have found human capital and its various proxies to have important impacts on adult health and
longevity. For an extensive survey of the literature see Sickles and Taubman (1997).
2of shocks to its fundamentals.
Our paper di!ers from other accounts of Þscal policy and indeterminacies in economic growth in
that here tax revenues do not provide an external e!ect through Þnancing public consumption goods
and infrastructure.6 In addition, in our model labour supply is inelastic, and thereby income taxation
does not a!ect the social returns to capital.7 Also, in this paper tax revenues are not used to Þnance
subsidies for human capital accumulation.8 Instead, in our model tax revenues are used to Þnance
intergenerational transfers.
Importantly, however, intergenerational redistribution is not su cient to generate multiplicity.
As we emphasize, it is the interaction of intergenerational redistribution and the dependence of longevity
on human capital that opens the door to local indeterminacy. The reason is that, for any given ratio-
nally anticipated longevity, private decisions on human capital accumulation may depend on rationally
anticipated tax-contributions, which in turn depend on actual longevity and hence private investments
in human capital. So, we have self-fulÞlling rational expectations equilibria.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Next Section lays out the model. Section 3 describes
individual choices, while Sections 4 and 5 characterize equilibrium paths. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
Time is discrete and is denoted with the superscript t   1. There is a population of agents belonging
to overlapping generations with Þnite but uncertain lifetimes. Each agent matures safely from youth to
adulthood and has a probability of surviving to old age. In the Þrst period of her life an agent decides
how much time to put into labour quality enhancing activities, like education, training and Þtness, and
how much time to devote to labour. An agent enjoys no leisure in youth and adulthood. So, a young
agent supplies her net-of-education time endowment to labour, as long as the returns from doing so are
positive. Similarly, as an adult, an agent allocates her time endowment to labour, if relevant returns are
positive, and consumes (part) of her returns from savings when young.9 If she survives to old age, an
agent does not work and consumes her returns from savings when adult. The endowment of time in each
period is normalized to one. Generation size is assumed to increase at a non-negative rate n ! 1 when
6See, for instance, Cazzavillan (1996), Park and Philippopulos (2004).
7See, for instance, Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (1997) and Guo and Lansing (1998).
8See Bond et. al. (1996) and Alonso-Carrera and Freire-Ser´ en (2004).
9For related modeling of human capital accumulation and discussions see, for instance, Lucas (1988) and Azariadis
(1993) Ch 14. Note that we abstain from parental investments towards childrens’ human capital, and any associated
altruism on the part of parents and/or intrafamily trade (see, for instance, Becker et.al. (1990), Ehrlich and Lui (1991)
and Nordblom (2003)). Allowing for such investments would give rise to a non-autonomous dynamic system making the
stability investigation of balanced growth paths intractable and the interpretation of our results cumbersome.
3in adulthood; that is each adult is assumed to bear n   1 children. All agents have identical preferences
and are aware of their life expectancies. Also, in period t = 1 government policies are introduced in the
form of income taxes/subsidies and pensions.
Let us denote with  t+1 " [ , ¯  ] the probability of an adult who was born in period t surviving
to the third period of her life, or longevity. Let  1 denoting the longevity of adults who are alive in
period t = 1, i.e. of the parents of the ‘Þrst’ generation t = 1. Moreover, ct+2
o denotes the consumption
of an old agent in period t + 2. In addition, consumption of an adult agent in period t + 1 is given by
ct+1
a . Furthermore, denote with ct
y the consumption of the typical young agent born in period t. Finally,
deÞne with ! " (0,1) the discount factor.
We then have that the expected lifetime utility of an agent of generation t is given by
"(ct
y) + !"(ct+1
a ) +  t+1!2"(ct+2
o ) (1)
where "() is a standard utility function.
An agent’s human capital determines, in a one-to-one way, the agent’s labour productivity. Each
agent enters her Þrst period of life with an amount of human capital, ht, which is inherited from her
parent. An adult’s human capital, however, is partly inherited from her parent and partly the result of
his own educational e!ort when young. In particular,
ht+1 = htµ(et), (2)
where et is the time/e!ort spent in education when young, and µ(0) = 1, µ0 > 0, µ00 < 0 and µ(1) # µ > 1
being Þnite. That is, the growth rate of human capital of agent t is an increasing and concave function of
her training when young. We also assume the Inada condition lime!0 µ0(0) = $. It ensures, in a simple
manner, that time spent in education is positive in each period, regardless of policies. The inherited
human capital of the typical agent born at time t = 1, h1, is exogenously given and assumed to be
strictly positive.
At this point we consider the workings of the capital market. Agents transact in the capital market
through intermediaries. These intermediaries are inÞnite-horizon entities, and, hence, when they enter
the capital market they face the risk-free interest rate. Denote with R the Þxed, exogenous, rate of
interest determined at the world level.10 When intermediaries lend to or borrow from individuals, the
corresponding rate must incorporate the risk involved due to the agents’ uncertain lifetimes. Assuming,
then, that intermediaries operate under conditions of perfect competition, and that entry is costless, we
10The small open economy assumption allows us to consider both R and the wage per unit of e ective labour w as
exogenous variables determined at the world level. This is a common assumption in this literature (see, for instance,
Galor and Weil, 2000). Alternatively, one could postulate that the economy is endowed with a production function which
is linear in capital and e ective units of labour, with R and w being the corresponding coe!cients of linearity (see, for
instance, Ehrlich and Lui, 1991, where R = 0 and w = 1).
4have that the rate of return faced by adult agents is equal to R/ t+1. Adult borrowers pay more than
the riskless rate of return R to compensate the intermediaries for the risk of the debtor’s death. Adult
lenders, on the other hand, earn a higher return than R, due to competition between intermediaries for
the appropriation of proÞts that may result from a lender dying and hence not claiming the return to
her investment. Also, as there is no risk involved with young agents, the rate of return they face by
entering the capital market is R. Finally, assume that the government is an inÞnitely-lived entity. Thus,
whenever it enters the capital market it also faces the riskless rate of return R.
Let us denote with f   0 a net subsidy received by young workers, and Þnanced through current
tax revenues, as a proportion of their income. Let also !t being the income tax rate in period t. We
then have that the consumption level of a young agent, born in period t   1, is
ct
y = wht(1 ! et)(1 ! !t + f ! st
y), (3)
where w is the Þxed wage per unit of e ective labour (normalized to 1 hereafter).11 Also, expressed as
a proportion of the typical young agent’s labour income ht(1!et), we have that st
y " 1!!t+f denotes
savings as young. The latter inequality implies non-negative consumption. We will say that f captures
the extend of forward intergenerational transfers between young and adult generations, i.e. from adult
to young workers.12
Let now b   0 being the net (e ective) tax contribution by adults, as a proportion of their labour
income, towards the Þnancing of current pensions.13 The consumption level of an adult agent, born in
period t   1, is, then,
ct+1
a = (1 ! !t+1 ! b ! st+1
a )ht+1 + Rst
yht(1 ! et), (4)
where st+1
a " 1 ! !t+1 ! b + (Rst
y(1 ! et)/µ(et)) denotes savings in adulthood, as a proportion of an
adult worker’s labour income. The latter inequality ensures non-negative consumption. We will say
that b reßects the extent of backward intergenerational transfers between old and adult generations, i.e.
from adult workers to senior citizens.
Each and every senior citizen who is alive in period t   2 receives a net (e ective) pension as a
proportion p of her e ective wage in adulthood.14 DeÞne with R( ) = R/  the rate of return to savings
11For our assumption that w is exogenously given, see the previous footnote.
12Here, we should mention that allowing for backward transfers in the form of f < 0 would also introduce Þxed
education-subsidies of the form deployed in the representative agent models of Bond et. al. (1996) and Alonso-Carrera
and Freire-Ser´ en (2004). As we would like to emphasise multiplicity of dynamic equilibria for completely di erent reasons
to the ones in those papers we choose to restrict attention to f   0. See also footnote 24.
13Note that this tax contribution can be thought of as including any PAYG contributions and any tax liabilities that
may arise from the returns to savings when young.
14Note that this pension can be thought of as being net of any tax liabilities that may arise from the returns to savings
when adult.
5on the part of adult workers who face longevity  . It follows that consumption in old age for generations








It will prove useful to derive the intertemporal budget constraint of the typical adult member of gener-







= ht+1[1 ! !t+1 ! b +
p
R( t+1)
] + ht[(1 ! et)R(1 ! !t + f)]
# ht+1"a(!t+1, t+1) + ht(1 ! et)"y(!t)
# ht+1"t+1
a + ht(1 ! et)"t
y
= ht{µ(et)"t+1
a + (1 ! et)"t
y}, (6)
where the last equation follows from using (2). Note that the wealth expressed in terms of labour income
as young is Þnite.
The net income tax/subsidy rate !t, t   1, is endogenously determined given the pension and
redistributive policies. In particular, the following government budget constraint is assumed to hold for
any t   1.












The above speciÞcation of policies and government’s budget constraint supports a wide range
of government inter-generational transfers.15 In particular, observe that in each period t + 1 the Þscal
mechanism is in need of htp pensions per pensioner. These revenue requirements can be Þnanced in a
number of ways. For instance, they can be Þnanced by taxing each adult worker by ht+1b. Alternatively,
pensions can be Þnanced by own contributions in adulthood. Or, they can be Þnanced by taxing young
workers and investing the proceeds in the capital market. In addition, in each period t the Þscal
mechanism is in need of fht(1 ! et) subsidies per young worker, due to forward redistribution, and
hence each adult worker is e ectively taxed by fht(1!et)n. So, in the present economy, labour incomes
are taxed to (partly) Þnance own pensions. Labour income is also taxed to Þnance current and future
pensions of the previous generation.
15Allowing for time variation in the policy parameters b, f and p - while maintaining the autonomous character of the
dynamic system that characterises our economy - could be done by conditioning the corresponding policies on before-tax
incomes. One way to justify such policies is to postulate a standard second-best taxation argument. Namely, (inherited)
human capital, i.e. the worker’s (inherited) productivity, and non-marketable activity et are not veriÞable tax attributes.
Before-tax labour income is, however, a veriÞable tax-base. So, policies have to be conditioned on income. Allowing for
income-dependent pension and transfer rates would complicate exposition considerably without altering the main insights
of the paper. Also, our dynamic system under exogenous longevity would be non-autonomous making the stability analysis
and the interpretation of our results cumbersome. Therefore, we have chosen to abstain from such policies.
6Importantly, the ‘initial’ income tax !1 is not pre-determined; it depends on the human capital
accumulation in the initial period µ(e1). In other words, the investment in human capital and thereby the
income tax ! - in the presence of intergenerational redistribution - is a jump variable. This observation
will prove to be crucial for our forthcoming results.
The above constraint can be rewritten as
!t = !( t,et) #
( tp/R) + n(1 ! et)f ! (bnµ(et)/R)
1 + n(1 ! et)
(8)
Note that !1 = p/R(1+n(1!e)). The e ect on tax burden of current longevity has the sign of the net
pension rate.16 So, intuitively, if the government provides pensions, longevity increases the tax rate faced
by current workers. Note also that 1 + n(1 ! et) is the total endowment supplied in the labour market
of period t per-adult. Thus, current investment in human capital decreases the tax base. However, it
also increases the contributions of next period’s adult workers towards their parents’ pensions for any
given backward transfer rate b, and it also decreases the forward subsidies for any given rate f. In fact,
!2 = nd/(1 + n(1 ! e)) : the net e ect of human capital investment in period t on current tax burden
has the sign of dt # !t ! f ! (bµ0(et)/R) = !( t,et) ! f ! (bµ0(et)/R) # d( t,et,f,p,b)
The model is completed by specifying one important feature which is the endogenous determina-
tion of the survival probability,  . By endogenising longevity the paper distinguishes itself from most
of the existing literature. Like in Blackburn and Cipriani (2002) and in Lagerl¨ of (2000) we assume
that longevity depends on human capital.17 In particular we assume that the longevity of generation t
depends on the average human capital level of that generation to reßect the fact that better educated
individuals are more likely to adopt healthy life-styles:18












  " 1. Notice that  0 > 0 and the Þniteness of longevity implies that for large levels of human capital
the longevity returns to human capital must be decreasing. In particular, it must be that there is # such
that  00(h) < 0 for any h > #, limh"!  00(h) = 0 and limh"!  0(h) = 0. However, there is no a priori
reason for assigning a particular concavity on the longevity function   for low levels of human capital.
It is equally plausible that  00(h) < 0 for any h, or that  00(h) > 0 for any h < #. In other words, it is
equally plausible that the longevity returns to knowledge are decreasing for any level of human capital,
or that for low (only) longevity the returns to better quality of life are increasing. Accordingly, in what
16Hereafter, a subscript i denotes the partial derivative of a multi-variable function with respect to its ith argument,
and a prime denotes the derivative of a single-variable function.
17For a model where longevity depends on medical research Þnanced by a labour tax see Chakraborty (2004).
18For relevant evidence see the extensive survey of the literature by Sickles and Taubman (1997).
7follows we allow in general for the function   to have an inßection point # such that  00 < 0 to the right
of it. Let also  1 =  (h1), and recall that h1, and hence  1, is pre-determined.




o , subject to (6) and ct
y   0, ct+1
a   0, ct+2
o   0, et $ [0,1], taking as given inherited
human capital, prices, policies and h
t+1
. Note that in equilibrium h
t+1
= ht+1 and that the equilibrium
paths for et, ct
y, ct+1
a , ct+2
o ,  t+1, follow from the solution to the above problem, (2), (9) and h
t+1
= ht+1
as a function of prices, policies and inherited human capital.
To facilitate our analysis, at this point we assume that the wealth of adult workers are positive;
otherwise, adult agents would not supply any labour. This amounts to 1!!t+1 !b+(p t+1/R) > 0 for
any generation t. DeÞne Fu(f;b,p, ¯  ) # maxe#[0,1] !(¯  ,e)!1 and Bl(b;f,p, ) # 1! maxe#[0,1] !( ,e)+
p( /R). Using the period t+1 counterpart of (8), one can easily see that the left-hand-side of the resulting
inequality has lower bound at Bl(b;f,p, ) ! b. Clearly, then, to ensure positive supply of labour by
adults, we assume that
A1: b < Bl(b;f,p, ).
We are now ready to proceed in the characterization of equilibria.
3 Individual Decisions
As the consumption choices are orthogonal to the issue of indeterminacy of dynamic equilibria this
paper focuses on, we refrain from discussing them.19 What is important for our purposes is the decision
over educational e ort. Given the envelope theorem and the constraint of non-negative consumption,





y)   0} where W(e,!t+1
a ,!t
y) ! µ(e) !a("t+1, t+1) +
(1"e) !y("t) is total wealth as a proportion of parental labour income. The trade-o  is obvious. Given
inherited human capital, investing in labour quality increases wealth as an adult worker at the cost
of lower income as a young worker. The resolution of this trade-o  gives a solution for investment in
human capital in period t   1 et = e( t+1,"t+1,"t,p,f,b).
As !t+1
a > 0 and µ00 < 0, the objective function is strictly concave, and hence e() is a well-deÞned
function. Also, due too the Inada condition on the human capital accumulation function µ, we have
that optimal level of investment is always positive, and so the economy is characterized by persistent
growth. Full-time education is optimal if lime!1 W1(e,!t+1
a ,!t
y)   0.
At an interior solution, on the other hand, the young worker’s trade-o  is resolved when the net
marginal gain of an extra unit of human capital investment is zero. Equivalently, when the marginal
19Clearly, for any given investment in human capital, an agent born in period t faces the standard problem of intertem-
poral allocation of consumption with price of consumption as young R, price of consumption when old  t+1/R, wealth ht
{µ(et) !a("t+1, t+1) + (1   et) !y("t)} and patience parameters # and # t+1.
8increase in the human capital growth equals the associated marginal loss of income when young in terms
of wealth when adult:




Note that Q( t+1,"t+1,"t,p,f,b) is the private rate of return to investment in human capital.20 Clearly,
then, Q2 = Q6 > 0, Q4 < 0 and Q3 = "Q5 < 0. In particular, Q2 = Q/!a("t+1, t+1), Q4 =
"Q2/R( t+1), and Q3 = "R / !a("t+1, t+1). That is, the price of human capital investment is in-
creasing, and so educational e ort is decreasing, with forward transfers, backward transfers and the
anticipated income tax rate in adulthood. On the other hand, the price of education is decreasing,
and so labour-enhancing activities are increasing, with the net pension rate and the income tax rate
in youth. Note also that Q1 = "Q2p/R : the e ect of anticipated longevity on the price of labour-
enhancing activities has the opposite sign of the net pension rate p. So, if senior citizens receive positive
pensions, investment in human capital increases with anticipated longevity.
Therefore, if government policies aim at increasing growth, forward and/or backward redistribu-
tion must be low. Also, a rationally anticipated increase in the income tax rate has ambiguous growth
e ects, as it decreases human capital investment by current young workers, while it will be increasing
educational e ort on the part of their children. Finally, an increase in the pension rate increases growth,
while it also a ects positively the growth e ect of longevity. Thus, an increase in net pensions has an
unambiguously positive growth e ect in an ageing society.
Before leaving this Section let us consider the implications of human capital accumulation being
independent of policies. This could, for instance, be the case if policies are such that µ0(1)   ¯ Q,
where ¯ Q is the maximum possible price of investment given policy parameters f,b,p.21 Introduction of
government in such an environment would result in maximum education and growth, in each period.22
Suppose that et = # for any t   1 where # # (0,1] is a scalar. It follows directly then from the
government’s budget constraint (8) that the income tax rate in each period t is uniquely determined
given any current longevity  t and the constant human capital accumulation µ(#). Thus, if the path of
longevity is uniquely determined, so is the path for income taxes. Note now that, as the initial human
capital is pre-determined and et = #, the path of human capital is uniquely determined. Therefore, so
is the path of longevity. Thus, the economy is characterized by a unique dynamic path that leads to
20We suppress the dependence of Q on the interest rate R for expositional clarity.
21Note, after eliminating "t and "t+1 from the deÞnition of Q by using (8), that, given policy parameters, b,f,p, the
price of investment has a lower upper bound at R
f Fl(f;b,p, )
Bl(b;f,p, ) b , where Fl(f;b,p, ) ! mine![0,1]  ( ,e) 1. Observe also,
here, that ensuring positive growth in each period in the absence of the Inada condition only requires µ0(0) > ¯ Q.
22Alternatively, we could postulate a continuous but non-di erentiable at   ! (0,1) function µ(e) with µ0( +) "Q and
µ0(  ) # ¯ Q, where Q is the minimum possible price of human capital investment (see next footnote). In this case, time
spend in education is constant over time and equal to  . Note that our model could also support zero growth in each
period. All that would be needed was to assume away the Inada condition and have, instead, that µ0(0) "Q.
9a uniquely determined BGP. This BGP is described by a human capital growth rate µ( ), longevity
!  = ¯ !, and income tax rate given by (8) with et =   and !t = ! .
Note now that without government the price of investment is R. Thus, in the absence of govern-
ment, the economy would be characterized by a unique positive level of education eN   min{1,µ0!1(R)}.
The above discussion implies then directly that our economy is characterized by a locally determinate
and unique BGP, described by maximum longevity ¯ ! and human capital growth rate µ(eN). Thus, a
necessary condition for indeterminacy is the existence of government and that investment in human
capital is responsive to income taxes.
To ensure in a simple manner sensitive to policy changes human capital formation, we assume
hereafter a positive labour supply by young agents, and thereby interior levels of education. That is,
after deÞning with Q the minimum price of investment given policy parameters f,b,p, we assume that23
A2: Q> µ0(1).
It follows that young agents supply some of their time endowment as labour and the rest towards
labour-enhancing activities, with the optimal investment in period t ! 1, e(!t+1,"t+1,"t,p,f,b), given
implicitly by (10). Also, after recalling (8), we have that, given any path of longevity, the equilibrium
path of income taxes must satisfy
"t =  (!t,e(!t+1,"t+1,"t,p,f,b)), for any t ! 1. (11)
The latter determines implicitly a well-deÞned di!erence equation for income taxes, given policy parame-
ters b,f,p and longevity path if and only if either  2(.,e) > 0 for any e " [0,1] or  2(.,e) < 0 for any e "
[0,1].24 DeÞne du = maxe"[0,1]{ (¯ !,e)#f #µ0(e)(b/R)} and dl = mine"[0,1] { (!,e)#f #µ0(e)(b/R)}.
We assume hereafter that
A3: Either (i) du < 0 or (ii) dl > 0.
A3(i) implies that dt < 0 for any t ! 1 and thereby  2(.,e) < 0 : education decreases the
equilibrium current income tax rate. Under A3(ii), on the other hand, we have that dt > 0 for any t ! 1
and hence  2(.,e) > 0 : education increases the equilibrium current income tax rate. It follows that,
23Note, after eliminating !t and !t+1 from the deÞnition of Q by using (8), that, given policy parameters, b,f,p, the
price of investment has a lower minimum bound at Q = R
f Fu(f;b,p,¯  )
Bu(b;f,p,¯  ) b with Bu(f;b,p, ¯ ") $ 1   mine![0,1] !(¯  ,e) +
p(¯  /R) and Fu(f;b,p, ¯  )   maxe [0,1]  (¯  ,e) ! 1.
24The Þrst partial derivative of the function  ( t,e( t+1,!t+1,!t,p,f,b)) with respect to !t+1 is  2e2, which vanishes
if and only if  2 = 0. Note, after using (8) to eliminate !t, that  2 = n (  ! f ! (bµ0/R)] / (1 + n(1 ! e)). Also,
we have that e2 = µ0 / [µ00(1 !   ! b + (p /R))]. Thus, the second own partial derivative of   with respect to !t+1 is
("( 2e2)/"e)e2, which, in turn, is equal to  2e22 + e2{(" 2/"e)e2}, which equals  2e22 + { 2(2ne2/(1 + n(1 ! e)))!
(e2nbµ00/R(1 + n(1 ! e)))}e2. The latter is strictly positive whenever  2 = 0. Due to continuity of  (.,e(.,!t+1,.)) and
its Þrst two derivatives, we then have that a vanishing point is also a local minimum. So, !t+1 is not uniquely determined
by !t =  (.,e(.,!t+1,.)) in the neighbourhood of vanishing points. Accordingly, to ensure a well-deÞned solution with
respect to !t+1 we must have no vanishing points.
10given A3, the equilibrium path of income taxes, for any path of longevity, satisÞes
 t+1 = T(!t+1,!t, t), for any t   1, (12)
with















We turn to the dynamic analysis of the economy in question.
4 Benchmark Case: Exogenous Longevity
We start our dynamic analysis by considering in this Section the benchmark case of exogenously given
longevity. In particular assume that the longevity path is given by !t+1 = F(!t) for any t   1, with F
being continuously di erentiable. Assume that lim  ¯    F(!) = ¯ ! and ¯ ! > F(!) > ! for any ! < ¯ !.
That is, suppose that longevity is strictly increasing over time, and is bounded from above by and
approaches ¯ !. Note that these properties of F imply also that lim  ¯    F0(!) " F0(¯ !)   0.
As we shall see shortly, the model with endogenous longevity produces a similar path for !.
That is, and after recalling our discussion in the previous Section, we have that in our model long-run
longevity is ¯ !, whether there is a government or not and whether longevity is exogenous or depends on
average human capital. Bearing this in mind, the analysis for the benchmark case is the following.
Given that longevity in the long-run is equal to ¯ !, the income tax rate in the BGP ¯   is given
implicitly by ¯   = !(¯ !,²(¯  , ¯ !)), where ²(¯  , ¯ !) " e(¯ !, ¯  , ¯  ,p,f,b) " ¯ e is the BGP education level. Note,
from (10), that the sign of R(f+b)!¯ !p determines whether the price of investment, under a government,
in a BGP with maximum longevity is greater or not than the laisser-faire price R. In particular, if
R(f + b) > ¯ !p investing in human capital is more costly under intergenerational transfers, and vice
versa. So, if R(f + b) > ¯ !p we have that ¯ e < eN, and vice versa. That is, if pensions are low
relatively to intergenerational transfers, i.e. p < R(f +b)/¯ !, long-run human capital accumulation and
growth rate are lower than their laisser-faire counterparts, and vice versa. Therefore, an interesting and
straightforward implication is that introducing a pension scheme where income tax revenues are solely
used to Þnance the pensions of current adult workers (i.e. f = b = 0), leads to higher long-run education
and growth rate.
In our model investing in human capital provides a positive external e ect, as total wealth of
a generation is proportional to inherited human capital (see (6)). Thus, the laisser-faire level of ed-
ucation eN will in general be ine"ciently low. Accordingly, if (part of) the objective of introducing
intergenerational redistribution is to improve long-run growth, the policy parameters p,b,f must be
11such that R(f + b) < ¯ !p. That is, correcting in the BGP the positive externality inherent in human
capital investment requires a su"ciently high net pension rate relative to the extent of intergenerational
redistribution. We assume this to be the case hereafter:
B1: R(f + b) < ¯ !p.
Given B1, we turn to the analysis of the BGP. From (10), we have that the BGP investment in
human capital ²(¯  , ¯ !) is such that ²1 = (R(f +b)! ¯ !p) / µ00(¯ e)"a(¯  , ¯ !)2 > 0. Thus, the BGP education
and income tax rate are positively related. The reason behind this counterintuitive result is simple.
An increase in the long-run income tax rate has two e ects on human capital investment. The Þrst is
positive, and arises from the decrease of the after-tax wage when young. The second e ect is due to the
decrease of the after-tax wage when adult. This e ect is negative, and B1 implies, in e ect, that is also
dominated by the former e ect.
Furthermore, global indeterminacy is a possibility. To see this, recall that the BGP income tax
rate is given by ¯   = !(¯ !,²(¯  , ¯ !)). DeÞne now ¯ d( ) = d(¯ !,²( , ¯ !),f,p,b). Obviously then, due to µ00 < 0
and B1, if A3(i) holds, and thereby ¯ d( ) < 0 for any  , we have that !(¯ !,²( , ¯ !)) is strictly decreasing
with   and hence a unique BGP income tax rate. If however A3(ii) holds, and thereby ¯ d( ) > 0 for
any  , we have that !(¯ !,²( , ¯ !)) is strictly increasing with  , and the emergence of multiple BGP tax
rates (and hence education levels and growth rates) depends on the curvature of !(¯ !,²( , ¯ !)) when
!2(¯ !,²( , ¯ !))²1( , ¯ !) = 1. In particular, if the tax   deÞned by !2(¯ !,²( , ¯ !))²1( , ¯ !) = 1 is a local
extremum of the function   ! !(¯ !,²( , ¯ !)) then for some parameter values there are two BGP taxes in
the neighbourhood of  .
We turn to the investigation of local indeterminacy around a given BGP. Under an increasing
longevity path towards ¯ !, regardless of the tax path, the stability properties of our economy around
a BGP depend solely on the tax function T() in (12). Note, that the income tax rate path is given
by  t+1 = T(F(!t),!t, t), or  t+1 !  t = T(F(!t),!t, t) !  t " G(!t, t). Obviously, given an
equilibrium {!t, t}, taxes are strictly increasing over time if G(!t, t) > 0, and vice versa. Consider,
now, the case of ¯ d( ) < 0 for any  , and, hence, recall from above, of a unique BGP. In this case, and
after recalling that e2 < 0, e3 > 0 and noting - due to B2 and hence Q < R - that e2 + e3 > 0, we
have that T3 > 1. Thus, G2 > 0. DeÞne with #(!) the well-deÞned solution of G(!,#(!)) = 0. Note that
#(!t) gives the level of income tax rate that would imply no change in the equilibrium income tax rate
given a current longevity !t. Clearly, we have that if  t > #(!t) then  t+1 >  t, while if  t < #(!t) then
 t+1 <  t. Notice also that #0(!) has the opposite sign of G1, with the latter being of an ambiguous sign
(as T1 > 0 and, in this case, T2 < 0). Nevertheless, it follows, after a standard phase-diagram analysis,
that, regardless of the sign of #0(¯ !), the unique BGP is locally saddle-path stable. Figures 1 and 2
demonstrate for the cases of a (locally) increasing and decreasing, respectively, #(!).
Consider, now, the case of ¯ d( ) > 0 for any  . In this case, we have T2 > 0 and hence, G1(¯ !, ¯  ) > 0
(as T1 > 0 and F0(¯ !)   0). DeÞne with $( ) the well-deÞned, in the neighbourhood of a BGP, solution of
12G( (!),!) = 0. Note that  (!t) gives the level of longevity that would imply no change in the equilibrium
income tax rate given a current tax !t. Clearly, we have that if "t >  (!t) then !t+1 > !t, while if
"t <  (!t) then !t+1 < !t. Notice also that  0(!) has the opposite sign of G2, with the latter being, in
this case, of an ambiguous sign. It follows, after a standard phase-diagram analysis, that a (local) BGP
is locally a sink, and thereby indeterminate, if the function  (!) is increasing in the neighbourhood of
the BGP. If, on the other hand,  (!) is decreasing in the neighbourhood of a BGP, the latter is locally
saddle-path stable and hence determinate. Figures 3 and 4 demonstrate for the cases of a (locally)
decreasing and increasing, respectively,  (!).25
Interestingly, the above discussion emphasises that if the tax burden decreases with current human
capital accumulation, the dynamic equilibrium under exogenous longevity is well-determined, while if
the tax burden increases with current human capital accumulation, the long-run equilibrium may be
indeterminate (globally and/or locally). SpeciÞcally, we have shown that
Proposition 1: Under A1, A2, A3(i) and B1, the BGP in the presence of intergenerational
transfers is unique and locally determinate.
Assume hereafter policies that ensure ¯ d(!) < 0 for any ! and thereby a unique and locally
determinate BGP. This amounts to restricting attention to policies that satisfy A3(i), which we re-write
for convenience as:
B2: du < 0.
Summarizing our discussion so far, we have that, for any (rationally anticipated) increasing and
stable path of longevity which is uniquely characterized by its initial longevity, and under intergen-
erational transfers that satisfy A1, A2, B1 and B2, higher education decreases current income taxes,
human capital investment is higher than its laisser-faire counterpart, and the economy is characterized
by a unique and locally determinate BGP.26 Also, if G1(¯ ", ¯ !) > 0, the economy converges to the BGP
with decreasing income taxes (see Figure 2). The latter, in conjunction with increasing longevity and
the fact that income taxes and education are negatively related, implies also (see (8)) that education is
increasing along the equilibrium path. If, on the other hand, G1(¯ ", ¯ !) < 0, the economy converges to the
BGP with increasing income taxes (see Figure 1) and education which may be increasing or decreasing.
We now turn to the case of endogenous longevity.
25One can also see, after a phase diagram analysis, that if ¯   is a local extremum of !( ) then, there is a well-deÞned
stable path which seperates the space {"   ¯ ", } into a stable manifold and an unstable manifold. So, the BGP is again
locally indeterminate.
26Note that while under B1 intergenerational redistribution subsidises, in e ect, human capital accumulation in the
long-run, B2 ensures determinacy of dynamic equilibria. See Bond et. al. (1996) and Alonso-Carrera and Freire-Ser´ en
(2004) for models where (short- and long-run) human capital investment subsidies create multiplicity of equilibra.
135 Equilibrium Characterization
Suppose that government policies aim at intergenerational redistribution (f   0,b   0) and that they
are designed in such a way to ensure that young and adult workers supply labour (see A1 and A2).
Suppose also that policies are designed to ensure a well-deÞned and unique long-run income tax, and
to improve long-run education (see B1 and B2). In this Section we study if the equilibrium around the
BGP is well-deÞned or if the economy is prone to animal spirits, due to endogenous longevity.
To analyse this question, note that in equilibrium, as members of any given generation are iden-
tical, longevity is determined by the human capital of the typical member, i.e. "t+1 = "(ht+1). Equiv-
alently, as "0 > 0, we have that ht+1 = #("t+1) where # = " 1: in equilibrium (rationally antici-
pated) longevity determines human capital and thereby time spent in education et = µ 1(ht+1
ht ). In
more detail, given optimal investment e(), the human capital accumulation function and the deÞni-
tion of the inverse function #, we have that the equilibrium path of longevity must satisfy "t+1 =
"(#("t)µ(e("t+1,!t+1,!t,p,f,b))) for any t   1.
Note that, for any Þxed pair of income taxes !t+1 and !t, the equilibrium longevity function
"(#(")µ(e())) is a member of the family of longevity functions deÞned by F(") in the previous Section.
So, one can very easily see that the path of longevity is again increasing, bounded from above by and
converging to ¯ ". Also, the BGP income tax is unique, due to B2, and given by ¯ !. Furthermore, the
unique BGP education is ¯ e > eN. In addition, the local determinacy of the unique BGP again depends
solely on the behaviour of the di erence equation which determines the income tax in any period t + 1
as a function of the state {"t,!t}.
Nevertheless, now, as longevity depends on education, the longevity path is not independent of
the tax path. The dependence of longevity on income taxes has, in turn, major implications for the
equilibrium path of income taxes. It is the interaction between the jointly determined paths of longevity
and income taxes that may open the door to animal spirits and local indeterminacy, even under our
assumptions so far.
In more detail, the Þrst implication of endogenising longevity is that the equilibrium longevity in
period t+1 may not be unique for any given state "t; that is, the function "t+1 = "(#("t)µ(e("t+1,.)))
may not imply a well-deÞned di erence equation for longevity. The reason is that, given the state
of the economy, the anticipated longevity depends on the evolution of human capital, which in turn
depends on anticipated longevity. This cyclicity is a direct consequence of the fact that individual
educational choice (and thereby individual human capital) in each period t   1 is determined by
economic agents, simultaneously and independently, after taking as given average human capital and
thereby the probability of survival in that period. This possibility has been emphasized and investigated
further in a similar model in Cipriani and Makris (2004a).
Here, instead, we assume away such multiplicity of equilibria in the neighbourhood of the BGP
14{¯ ", ¯ !} by denoting with k(h) ! "0(h)h/"(h) the elasticity of longevity with respect to human capital,
and focusing on an environment where
C1: limh!" k(h) 6= µ(¯ e)/[¯ "µ0(¯ e)e1(¯ ", ¯ !, ¯ !,p,f,b)] ! $.
Note that $ is the product of the inverse elasticities of human capital accumulation (w.r.t. time
spent in education), and of education w.r.t. anticipated longevity, evaluated in the long-run. This
critical value depends solely on the technology µ(e), maximum longevity ¯ ", and the government policies
that satisfy the budget constraint (8) and A1, A2, B1 and B2. Given C1 we have that longevity, around
the BGP {¯ ", ¯ !} is driven by a di erence equation
"t+1 = !("t,!t+1,!t) for any t   1. (15)
Note from µ() > 0, e() > 0 and the properties of "() that " < !(",.) < ¯ " for any " < ¯ ", and,
crucially, for any pair of income taxes !t+1,!t. That is, if inherited human capital is Þnite, we have
that, as educational e ort is exerted in equilibrium, the rationally anticipated longevity (and human
capital) is higher than the longevity (and human capital) of the parent generation. We also have that
lim !¯     ( ,.) = ¯   for any path of income taxes. That is, if the parent generation have had maximum
longevity then the only rationally anticipated longevity is the maximum one. These properties of  
imply also that lim  ¯     ( ,.)    1(¯  ,.) ! 0.
Furthermore, we have that
 2( t,!t+1,!t) =
e2( (),!t+1,!t,p,b,f)/e1( (),!t+1,!t,p,b,f)
D( t,!t+1,!t)







 0("( t)µ(e()))"( t)µ0(e())e1()
" 1. (17)
As e2 < 0 and e3 > 0, we have that  2 and  3 have opposite signs. Also, as e1 > 0 - due to B1,  3 has the
sign of D. In other words, despite higher investment implying higher future human capital and thereby
longevity, education and anticipated longevity may not be correlated after a change in the current or
future income tax rates. This will indeed be the case if D < 0, i.e. if, given inherited human capital,
longevity and/or human capital accumulation and/or education as a function of anticipated longevity
are su!ciently elastic (note that  0(hµ(e))hµ0(e)e1/µ(e) is equal to the product of the elasticities in
question).27
The above discussion implies that the dynamic behaviour of our economy, close to the BGP, is
determined by the system of equations (12) and (15), with  1 being pre-determined by the initial stock
27Notice that if D < 0 then  3 < 0, e3 > 0,  2 > 0 and e2 < 0. If, on the other hand, D > 0 then  3 > 0, e3 > 0,
 2 < 0 and e2 < 0.
15of human capital h1 = "( 1), and !1 being free. Note, however, that according to T() the income tax
in period t + 1 depends on current longevity. Alternatively, we have, given (15), that income taxes
must satisfy !t+1 = T( ( t,!t+1,!t), t,!t) for any t ! 1. Interestingly, the temporal equilibrium of
our economy may still not be uniquely determined. In fact, due to self-fulÞlling prophecies, there may
be multiplicity of equilibrium income tax rate in period t+1 for any given past tax rate !t. The reason
is similar to the one above: individual decisions on educational e"ort depends on rationally anticipated
longevity  t+1 and income taxes !t+1, with the latter depending on anticipated longevity and thereby
individual decisions. This possibility has been highlighted and analysed further in a similar model in
Cipriani and Makris (2004b). Here, instead, we assume away such multiplicity in the neighbourhoood
of the BGP. We do so by assuming hereafter that
C2: limh ! k(h) < #
Given C2 we have that the dynamic equilibrium, close to the BGP, is characterized by (15) and
!t+1 = ˆ T( t,!t) for any t ! 1, (18)
with
ˆ T1 =
T1 1 + T2
#
ˆ T2 =
T1 3 + T3
#
, (19)
where #   #(ˆ T( t,!t), t,!t) = 1"T1 2 = (1+D)/D. Therefore, under C1 and C2, current longevity
and income tax rate deÞne uniquely the next period’s income tax rate, and all these, in turn, determine
uniquely next period’s longevity.
Nevertheless, once next period arrives, bygones are bygones. True, longevity is determined by
the past, but the income tax rate is not pre-determined. Given longevity, the income tax rate depends
solely on investment in human capital, and not on past taxes and longevities (see (8)). In fact, the past
will have a bite on current education and income tax rate only if the long-rum equilibrium is saddle-path
stable, as then the BGP is approached by a unique path { t,!t}. If the BGP is locally stable, then the
economy will be open to self-fulÞlling prophecies and multiple equilibrium paths towards the BGP will
exist.
To determine the local stability properties of the BGP, deÞne ˆ G( t,!t)   ˆ T( t,!t)"!t. Following
the steps in the previous Section we then have in a straightforward manner that the unique BGP is locally
saddle-path stable and hence determinate if ˆ G2(¯  , ¯ !) > 0. Consider, here, the case of ˆ G2(¯  , ¯ !) < 0. DeÞne
with ˆ #( ) the well-deÞned solution of G( , ˆ #( )) = 0. We then have that if !t > ˆ #( t) then !t+1 < !t,
while if !t < ˆ #( t) then !t+1 > !t. It follows, after a standard phase-diagram analysis, that the unique
BGP is locally a sink, and thereby indeterminate. Figure 5 demonstrates for the case of increasing
ˆ #( ).28
28One can also see, after a phase diagram analysis, that if ˆ G2(¯  , ¯ !) = 0 and ˆ G1(¯  , ¯ !) 6= 0 then the stability properties
16It turns out that ˆ G2(¯  , ¯ !) < 0 can, in principle, be the case. That is, policies that satisfy A1, A2,
B1 and B2 can create local indeterminacy when longevity is endogenous, even if they induce a unique
equilibrium path under any autonomous, increasing and stable longevity path. In particular, we have:
Proposition 2: Under A1, A2, B1, B2, C1 and C2, there is a critical elasticity of longevity
¯ k such that the BGP is locally indeterminate if longevity is su ciently elastic at the limit (# >
limh ! k(h) > ¯ k > $), while the BGP is locally determinate if longevity is su ciently inelastic at
the limit (limh ! k(h) < ¯ k).
Proof. If limh ! k(h) < $ then D(¯  , ¯ !, ¯ !) > 0, while if # > limh ! k(h) > $ then
D(¯  , ¯ !, ¯ !) $ ("1,0). As  1(¯  ,.) ! 0, and T1 > 0, T2 < 0 we thus have that in the former case
# > 0, while in the latter case # < 0. Note that " ˆ G2 = 1 " ˆ T2. So, the BGP is locally determinate
if ˆ T2(¯  , ¯ !) > 1 and locally indeterminate if ˆ T2(¯  , ¯ !) < 1. Note, after using the deÞnition of #, that
1 " ˆ T2 =
1"T3"T1( 2+ 3)
(1+D)/D . Clearly, as T3 > 1, e1 > 0 and e2 + e3 > 0, if limh ! k(h) < $ we have that
 2(¯  , ¯ !, ¯ !) +  3(¯  , ¯ !, ¯ !) > 0 and 1 < ˆ T2(¯  , ¯ !). If, on the other hand, limh ! k(h) > $ we have that
 2(¯  , ¯ !, ¯ !) +  3(¯  , ¯ !, ¯ !) < 0 and the sign of 1 " ˆ T2(¯  , ¯ !) depends on the size of D(¯  , ¯ !, ¯ !) and hence of
limh ! k(h). It follows in a straightforward manner, after noting ˆ T2 =
D[T1 3+T3]
(1+D) , that 1 > ˆ T2(¯  , ¯ !)





(T3"1) ), evaluated at the BGP. As
1+(e3/e2)
(T3"1) $ ("1,0) and D(¯  , ¯ !, ¯ !) is strictly decreasing
with limh ! k(h), there is a unique critical value ¯ k $ ($,#) such that if limh ! k(h) > ¯ k, then
D <
1+(e3/e2)
(T3"1) and if limh ! k(h) < ¯ k, then D >
1+(e3/e2)
(T3"1) - evaluated at the BGP. ¥
6 Conclusion
This paper is an attempt to study the interaction of ageing and intergenerational redistribution in
a model where longevity and policies are determined jointly within a dynamic general equilibrium
model. Our analysis has been based on a simple OLG model in which life expectancy increases with
human capital and agents invest in education, produce and consume output, and receive a pension
upon retirement. In our model, government policies aim at intergenerational redistribution. Policies
also ensure that all potential workers supply labour. Finally, redistributive and pension policies are
designed to ensure a well-deÞned and unique long-run income tax, and long-run growth higher than its
laisser-faire level.
Our model produces an expectations coordination problem between the private and Þscal sectors,
that can explain signiÞcant di erences in growth paths followed by otherwise identical countries. In
particular, we show that if longevity is su!ciently elastic when human capital is very high, then our
depend on the monotonicity of ˆ  (!) in the neighbourhood of the BGP, where ˆ  (!) is the well-deÞned solution of ˆ G(ˆ  (!),!) =
0. Notice, that local indeterminacy will be the case if ˆ  0(!) > 0 for any ! < ¯ ! in the neighbourhood of the BGP. If, on the
other hand, ˆ G2(¯ ", ¯ !) = ˆ G1(¯ ", ¯ !) = 0, the stability properties of the BGP cannot be determined.
17economy will be characterized by local indeterminacy of dynamic equilibria and hence the possibility
of sunspot equilibria. This raises the issue of how agents can coordinate their expectations. This issue
points to future research for criteria of equilibrium selection.
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